Toward a New Theory of Waste: from  Matter Out of Place  to Signs of Life ﻿ by Reno, Joshua
Binghamton University
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
Anthropology Faculty Scholarship Anthropology
9-2014
Toward a New Theory of Waste: from "Matter Out
of Place" to Signs of Life
Joshua Reno
Binghamton University--SUNY, jreno@binghamton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/anthropology_fac
Part of the Linguistic Anthropology Commons, and the Social and Cultural Anthropology
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Anthropology at The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted
for inclusion in Anthropology Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more
information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reno, Joshua, "Toward a New Theory of Waste: from "Matter Out of Place" to Signs of Life " (2014). Anthropology Faculty Scholarship.
3.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/anthropology_fac/3
 1 
Toward a new theory of waste: from ‘matter out of place’ to signs of life 
Joshua O. Reno, Binghamton University 
 
Abstract: 
This paper offers a counterpoint to the prevailing account of waste in the human sciences.  This 
account identifies waste, firstly, as the anomalous product of arbitrary social categorisations, or 
“matter out of place,” and, secondly, as a distinctly human way of leaving behind and 
interpreting traces, or a mirror of culture.  Together, these positions reflect a more or less 
constructivist and anthropocentric approach.  Most commonly, waste is placed within a 
framework that privileges considerations of meaning over materiality and the threat of death over 
the perpetuity of life processes.  For an alternative I turn to bio-semiotics and cross-species 
scholarship around the question of the animal.  Specifically, the paper asks what theories of 
waste would look like if instead of taking “dirt” as their starting point, they began with trans-
species encounters with animal scat.  Following bio-semiotics and efforts to deconstruct the 
animal/human binary, it is suggested that the objectual forms commonly referred to as “waste” 
are not arbitrarily classified, but purposefully expended, and thus symptomatic of life’s spatio-
temporal continuation.  Waste matter, therefore, is best construed not as anthropocentric but as 
semi-biotic: a sign of the form of life to which it once belonged.  This alternative perspective has 
implications for how approaches to industrial forms of mass waste can be reconceived. 
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Introduction: 
 
Reality is opaque; but there are certain points—clues, signs—which allow us to decipher it. 
        [Carlo Ginzburg 1980:27] 
 
Scholarship on waste, filth and other forms of bad matter has in many ways served as a testing 
ground, a theoretical laboratory, for both social constructivism and attempts to identify and 
overcome its weaknesses.  Seemingly polluting objects and bodies are imbued with a power, a 
re-pulsion, that makes it hard to separate the sensuous thing itself from its image, much like the 
spectral aura of the commodity as described by Marx (see Taussig 1993: 22).  However, just 
because something provokes my disgust does not mean that I can blame inherent qualities that 
the thing possesses.  This was the ultimate lesson of Mary Douglas’ seminal 1966 book Purity 
and Danger, which became a touchstone for the social constructivist alternative to common 
sense: though appearance may suggest otherwise, things are judged ‘polluting’ because of how 
they fit within encompassing systems of social classification.  As Douglas (1984) put it, ‘dirt is 
matter out of place’; for something to be filthy, polluting, dangerous, it must violate some ideal 
sense of the way things ought to be.1  
 With the recent emergence of waste studies across the human sciences, the legacy of 
Douglas is still apparent.  In its most basic sense, ‘waste’ is typically assumed to be something 
unwanted and discarded, the opposite and symbolic counterpart of a valued treasure.  Following 
Douglas, waste would be like dirt, that is, relational by definition.  For something to be ‘waste’ it 
would have to be defined as such in the active imaginations of human beings, who in doing so 
perform their social distinction from one another, just as they distinguish wasted from more 
valued items (see Frow 2003).  If one begins with the constructivist paradigm, it makes little 
sense to speak of ‘waste’ apart from uniquely human powers of symbolic valuation at all.  But 
could there be other ways to imagine such materials?  In this paper, I ask what it might mean for 
conceptions of waste, and critical theory more broadly, if we were to start from a different 
approach, bio-semiotics, modelled on an alternative substance, animal faeces.  This analysis 
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challenges two central premises of the social constructivist paradigm, arguing, first, that it is 
meaningful to speak of ‘waste’ as a set of objects in the world that pre-exist symbolic 
categorisation, and, second, that as a consequence waste is not only a mirror of human culture, 
but also a sign of and for other-than-human beings.   
Over the last decade scholars have regularly appealed to forms of bad matter as antidotes 
to familiar forms of social constructivism.  For one thing, the rise of environmentalism since 
Purity and Danger has shifted the meaning of ‘pollution’ considerably (though not without 
resistance, see Meigs 1978) and has complicated the classification of impurity as primarily 
arbitrary and contingent.  Accounts of waste usually begin with Douglas, but hasten to point out 
that those things that have been deemed worthless and rejected cannot be completely social and 
cultural but, on some level, must possess a significant material character as well (Hawkins 2006; 
Gille 2007; O’Brien 2008; Reno 2009; Gregson et al. 2010).  This materiality takes on different 
forms in these accounts, but at minimum it represents a supplement to forms of classification, 
some linguistic and/or cognitive anomaly foreclosed by them—in convergence with Douglas’ 
approach (see for example Leach 1964)—or an embodied sensuousness that exceeds the 
symbolic altogether. 
My analysis has been inspired by these approaches, but the furthest they go toward 
challenging social constructivism is by shifting the balance and evoking materiality as its double.  
Characteristic in this regard is Jane Bennett’s Vibrant Matter, where encounters with landfills 
and trash serve as prototypical examples of Thing-Power: ‘the curious ability of inanimate things 
to animate, to act, to produce effects dramatic and subtle’ (2009: 6).  But can the thinginess of 
waste, vibrant though it may be, do without Douglasian classifications?  Is not a landfill the 
product of millions of tiny acts of symbolic rejection, whereby a human agent decided what was 
relatively disposable?  Is not waste management a process that takes advantage of this social 
relativity, particularly the multifaceted regimes of value by which rejected matter can be 
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repurposed for personal and corporate profit (see Reno 2009)?  Litter and landfills are only 
available to produce the effects Bennett bears witness to because they have already been 
categorised and acted upon by humans.  To suggest that waste is also material after it has been 
categorically rejected is an important first step, but not entirely satisfactory if its anthropocentric 
origins remain unaddressed.  Emphasizing the distinctive thinginess of material objects, as a 
corrective to anthropocentric claims of human distinctiveness, presumes that we have a firm 
grasp on human thinginess and vitality, on our animal bodies and their worldly immersion, when 
investigating these more closely could reveal continuities that offer a counterpoint to the 
presumption of human/nonhuman divides.   
An alternative strategy would isolate forms of waste for which the aesthetics of symbolic 
rejection are harder to discern, as is the case with faeces.  Excrement is caught up in the same 
systems of valuation and distinction as are other rejectamenta (Reid 1993; Laporte 2000; Collins 
2008).  As Lea (1999) and Inglis (2002) argue, excretion has been profoundly shaped by social 
and political forces, which have infused its embodiment with classificatory distinctions between 
high and low, private and public, sanitary and unsanitary, civilised and animalistic (see also 
Stallybrass and White 1989).  Excrement too can be a source of economic value (for example, as 
raw material for the creation of fertilizer or biogas) and is perhaps even more productive as a 
source of humour and insult.  As anthropologist Sjaak van der Geest puts it, in a play on the 
classic Douglasian analysis: 
The faeces I carry with me in my body are in the right place (as long as they do not stay 
there for too long) and do not worry me. They may become dirty if someone starts to 
draw special attention to their presence and tries to discredit the human body as ‘a sack of 
shit.’ (2007: 384) 
 
Excrement is seldom discussed in critical theory despite its universality as an aspect of human 
experience, scatological scholars tend to point out, but this experience is shared with others.  The 
significance of this connection is glimpsed only if we halt the inevitable move toward 
constructivist analysis and meditate uncomfortably on the mere fact of living with a body.  
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Rather than the amassed waste of entire populations, the collectively rejected and sorted contents 
of cesspools and sewers, imagine the singular animal body and its specific waste deposit.  
Regardless of historical and cultural location, regardless of species, there is a non-arbitrary 
connection between the insides of the animal body and the matter that it releases.  For a time, 
faeces even resemble the organs from which they spring—not only the shape of the intestinal 
tract, but also the sealing impressions of a closing sphincter.   Considered in this respect, and 
regardless of what comes next, a human defecates in principle just like any other animal, insofar 
as they all must do so—it is a necessary aspect of living with bodies.2 
In part, the equation of waste with Douglasian ‘dirt’ has appealed to social theorists 
because taboo, religion, and classification represent more established intellectual terrain than 
faeces, sewers, and toilets.  It also corresponds well with the dominant focus of Cold War human 
sciences on meaning and systems theory, influenced by forays into cybernetics, semiotics and 
other informational inter-disciplines (see Boyer 2010).  The ultimate problem with anomalous 
‘dirt’, after all, is that it represents noise or gaps in a world overlain with meaningful 
systematicity.  Within anthropology, there have been several criticisms of Douglas, many of 
which have focused on the difficulty of explaining pollution and taboo purely through arguments 
about anomaly and the preservation of order (Bulmer 1967; Meigs 1978).  Of these, the closest to 
the theory I would like to present is that of anthropologist Valerio Valeri (2000), who argues 
against postulating a ‘pollution/taboo’ complex that rests more on meaning than embodiment.  
Unlike Valeri, however, I do not wish to talk only about the significance humans attribute to 
bodies, but to broaden this discussion to include the attributions that non-human creatures make, 
a way of thinking otherwise known as bio-semiotics (see Hoffmeyer 1996; Kohn 2007; Favareau 
2010).  In this regard I am inspired also by the emergence of multispecies ethnographic 
approaches, which ask that we take seriously how humans live with nonhumans, which means 
going beyond how they are domesticated into food, labor, laboratory experiments or household 
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companions (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010: 552; Siegel 2011).  I argue that a bio-semiotic 
interpretation of waste offers one such approach.  Animals not only share the experience of 
excretion, their excreted substances regularly traffic between bodies.   
By evoking ‘the animal’ I am not making a loose appeal to ‘the natural’ or ‘the 
nonhuman’, but making a precise demarcation between natural kinds.  Exploring the shared 
kingdom of animals, and its fleshy entailments, is burdened with its own anthropocentric 
presuppositions, which Agamben (2004), Derrida (2008) and others have made recent efforts to 
deconstruct (see also Wolfe 2003; Haraway 2008; Oliver 2009; Berger and Segarra 2011).  They 
warn that approaching the question of the animal too often resurrects a generic other that 
mutually constitutes ‘Man’ (and over which ‘He’ has dominion).  In this procedure, which 
Agamben aptly describes as the ‘anthropological machine’, animalization is an all too common 
temptation, which has the consequence of ascribing to both non-human creatures and some 
humans the stereotypical characteristics of ‘the Animal’, specifically, irresistible, machine-like 
compulsions.  This animalistic caricature, to which bio-semiotics was precisely developed as an 
alternative, emerged in constitutive relation to the rise of ‘Man’ in the abstract.  Following 
Agamben’s suggestion (2004: 92), bio-semiotics suspends differences between human and 
animal, resisting their dissolution into the ‘bare life’ of scientific taxonomies by emphasizing 
their shared immersion in a world veiled by mystery, opacity, made fleetingly apparent through 
clues, signs.  
For much of this essay, I use the word of animal trackers—‘scat’—rather than the more 
colloquial ‘shit’ or the neutral ‘faecal matter’, in order to emphasize the status of waste as a bio-
semiotic sign in cross-species communication.  If a substantive metaphor is needed to express 
waste as a useful category of analysis, what if we were to use not Douglasian ‘dirt’ but animal 
scat?  Animal scat has much to recommend it.  For one thing, unlike the worthless/valuable or 
dirty/clean binaries, excrement has no clear opposite or symbolic counterpart.  Unlike garbage, it 
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is rejected because it must be; unlike dirt, it must be polluting because a body has already 
extracted (nearly) all its value as a source of nourishment.  On some level scat is a readily 
definable biological form, a necessary product of animal digestion independent of socially 
contingent categorisations.  While very few creatures recognize dirt, furthermore, very many 
recognize scat as something distinct from other objects, as any dog owner can attest.  Of course, 
it is mainly humans who have notions about the impurity of excrement.  My argument is not that 
constructivist classification is absent from the signification of this form of waste, but only that 
such higher order interpretations arrive late to the party.  Before scat can be cognized as 
something more abstract, like an anomaly that threatens some moral-symbolic system, it can be 
and is perceived as a far more basic sign, one associated with living animals.  Could all waste, 
not just scat, be productively interpreted in this light?  This is the guiding question of this article. 
Exploring the cross-species lives of non-human animals also offers a different strategy to 
challenge anthropocentric interpretations of waste.  Another outcome of environmentalism has 
been a tendency to identify waste and pollution as primarily representative of the destruction of 
nature and as a representation of human separation from and domination of the earth.  This is a 
well-established phallocentric and anthropocentric reading of human-environmental relations 
that overemphasizes human dominion while downplaying the entanglement of human histories 
with non-human forces, landscapes and ecologies (see Plumwood 1994).  According to the 
conventional environmentalist perspective, waste appears as the clearest symptom of the human 
destruction of the planet.  On the one hand, the size of a landfill or bag of refuse is directly 
proportionate to a use of real resources and therefore represents it iconically, both in terms of the 
present commodities now cast aside and those absent that will likely be consumed to replace 
them.  On the other hand, the need to dispose of some quantity and type of waste represents a 
proportionate environmental impact on real places and beings.   
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This environmentalist reading is part of a broader tendency to interpret waste as reflective 
of human society and culture.  There is a very practical sense in which something cast aside by 
someone still bears traces of their former relationship.  If I look through your garbage can, I will 
likely learn things about you I wouldn’t know otherwise, as so-called ‘garbologists’ know well 
(Rathje and Murphy 1991).  More broadly, waste is taken as a register of human civilisation; 
landfills and middens, encoded with our general habits and relationships, wait for someone to 
decipher them.  The discipline of archaeology has historically been almost entirely dependent on 
the analysis of material remains left behind and their ability to serve as a mirror of culture.  As 
John Knechtel puts it, ‘To purge the earth of garbage’ as zero waste initiatives would have it, 
‘would be to destroy our own reflection’ (2007: 9). 
I want to build on this reading of waste as encoded culture to suggest a more bio-semiotic 
approach, modelled on animal scat, which acknowledges it as semi-biotic, that is, as a sign or 
remnant of a form of life, whether human or otherwise.  This contributes to the critique of 
anthropocentrism and human narcissism, not by elevating the status of inert matter, but by 
reasserting the embodied animality that humans share with many other species.  According to 
linguistic convention humans produce stool, while animals produce scat or droppings.  My 
analysis of scat as a cross-species phenomenon is meant to reassert the shared animality of the 
human body; my bio-semiotic assertion that this animality is communicative and flexible 
challenges the conflation of ‘animality’ with brute, animalistic instinct.  Most uses of the term 
‘scat’ maintain boundaries between the human and the non-human, marking excretion as 
animalistic, in relation to which human beings appear exceptional, more-than-animal, precisely 
because human faeces is not (or ought not to be) scat-tered in the open and exposed to public 
examination.  That is, unless it takes the anodyne form of a ‘stool sample’ temporarily captured 
and preserved for a medical gaze.  As I will discuss in more detail in the conclusion, this 
conventional distinction between stool/scat speaks to the presumptive ability of humans to cover 
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their tracks—to put the traces they leave behind under erasure (Derrida 2008)—at the very core 
of anthropocentric conceits. 
A complementary claim of the social constructivist approach, and one encouraged by the 
relationship between waste and environmental disturbance, is that contaminating things are not 
merely ‘disorderly’ but also signify material finitude (Gregson et al. 2010) and ultimately death 
(see Trotter 2003; Scanlan 2005).  For the Douglasian approach to taboo, there is an implicit 
reliance on subjective threat and anxiety in order to provide motive force for classificatory 
operations (see Kristeva 1982).  While an association between waste and death is compelling, it 
leaves out the extent to which waste more centrally indexes the perpetuation of life, has done so 
for far longer and with greater significance.  When interpreted through animal scat, rather than 
dirt, both bodily waste and discarded artefacts are revealed to share more than symbolic 
relevance, they actively resemble each other because of the similar interpretive fate they face 
when separated from the form of life—the living process—that gave rise to them.  The transience 
of decomposing and deteriorating matter can be seen as loss, but also as the perpetuation of life.  
Unless they are actively maintained and preserved under the right conditions, moreover, such 
objectual forms become unbound and gradually devolve into other life processes (see DeSilvey 
2006).  This may also account for the sense of repulsion that bad matter evokes: ‘What disgusts, 
startingly,’ William Ian Miller finds, ‘is the capacity for life’ (1998: 40; see also Kolnai 2003).  
This shared indication of and possibility for life marks scat as ‘waste’ on a basic bio-
semiotic level.  For motile creatures (i.e., most animals), waste is a means of registering that 
another body has passed by and continues to endure.  As a sign of the form of life to which it 
once belonged, a remnant, waste matter is not at all a symbolic classification, but a sign of life.  
Borrowing a turn of phrase from Georges Bataille’s (1991) general economy, I suggest that the 
objectual forms commonly referred to as ‘waste’ are, in fact, critical expenditures for the 
continuation of life in time and space.  In the conclusion, I argue that such an analysis also 
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accounts better for the ways that both humans and non-humans interpret and react toward 
different forms of bad matter.  This reappraisal of waste does more than resist Douglasian 
analysis; it also reveals how modern forms of distinctly human mass wasting obscure the role of 
excretion in inter-corporeal and cross-species relating and thus reaffirm human exceptionalism 
and an anthropocentric constructivism.   
 
A stroll through the wastes of animals and men 
 
In my former neighbourhood in South London, a person on a stroll may encounter a wide variety 
of wastes, but the most common are:  
1) pieces of litter than have been cast aside, thrown from cars or perhaps scattered by 
animals and the elements,  
2) alleyways that bear the unmistakable stench of frequent public urination,  
3) bird droppings, usually along sidewalks lined with trees where they regularly 
perch, and  
4) dog scat, often in parks on public patches of grass.3  
The London city government and its denizens are aware of these wastes and their regular 
accumulation. They dispatch street cleaners on foot and in machines to remove stray litter every 
week, they provide public refuse containers for trash and special bins for dog-walkers to use near 
places where violations are frequent, and they affix ‘pigeon spikes’ along roof edges to 
discourage birds from landing and defecating in front of businesses, public buildings, and 
homes.4  City-dwellers are accustomed to reading this cross-species landscape and apportioning 
moral responsibility to the humans behind the wastes:  
Animals are somewhat like children. They have no clear identity and they have no bad 
intentions. If they deposit their excreta in my private territory, it is hardly an intrusion 
into my life. Animals do not intrude. However, when I suspect the owner of the dog to be 
behind the dog’s behaviour my discomfort and disgust will grow. The owner is intruding 
through his dog. The neighbour’s dog’s shit found at my door is metonymically my 
neighbour’s shit. (Geest 2007:392) 
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Londoners rarely hold pigeons or dogs morally accountable for their scat, but tend to trace this 
evidence back to their fellow human cohabitants.  Pigeons and dogs may not be members of our 
moral communities in this way, but they are still active participants in a mutual environment and 
there are times when this becomes apparent, revealing a ‘threshold that precedes all 
interpretation’ where animals ‘are perceived in their pure singularity, as distinct beings that 
participate in the world of the living and that regard us in the same light’ (Bailly 2011: 13).  If 
pigeons begin to defecate over one’s head, for example, real pigeons take precedence over 
quarrels with imagined city planners, and their conspicuous co-presence as living beings has to 
be taken into account.   
Managing the scat of non-human animals requires that planners and cleaners take the 
animal’s habits and intentions into account, with pigeon spikes a clear example.  According to 
the Estonian ethologist (and anti-Darwinian vitalist) Jakob von Uexküll, different creatures can 
be imagined as if they existed in their own worlds: ‘To do so we must blow, in fancy, a soap 
bubble around each creature to represent its own world, filled with the perceptions which it alone 
knows’ (1957: 5).  These bubbles, he argued, do not conceal the world from creatures—since this 
suggests that ‘the world’ can be ever be totally perceived—but rather, it reveals different worlds 
to them, in the same way that distinct perceptual abilities allow most humans to recognize a 
broader colour spectrum than dogs and deer, whereas the latter are better at detecting and 
discriminating odours.  Uexküll described the use of these representational faculties as 
constructing perceptual worlds, or umwelt, through which different creatures are able to engage 
with their immediate environment and each other. 
It is not possible or necessary to move through my former neighbourhood as a dog or 
pigeon in order to imagine the difference that doing so would entail.  What interests me here is 
how waste serves as a sign of the creatures with whom we share our worlds and their habits.  
Uexküll’s ideas became foundational to the emerging interdiscipline of bio-semiotics, innovated 
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by the likes of Thomas Sebeok and, more recently, biologists like Marcelo Barbieri and Jesper 
Hoffmeyer (see Favareau 2010).  The core idea of bio-semiotics is that life requires the use of 
signs, as organisms must engage with the world around them within the perceptual and 
behavioural limitations of their developing form.  Referring to these engagements as ‘signs’ and 
the interpretation of them as ‘mind,’ is not meant to deny the very different meaning that these 
terms generally assume for human worlds, but only to highlight the mediation of an organism’s 
purposeful activity in its environment.  Acknowledging that non-human creatures interpret signs 
does not mean crediting them with human thoughts or motivations, only recognizing the 
adaptable ‘pensivity’ with which they gaze upon us and the world we all share (Bailly 2011:15).       
Waste is not typically approached as a bio-semiotic problem and the material/social 
binary described above arguably tends to foreclose this possibility.  But some approaches to 
waste, limited as they are in other ways, make clearer its connection to vitality, in the same way 
that Valeri recognized pollution is bound to corporeality.  The general economy of Georges 
Bataille, while ultimately embracing finitude and dualism in a way that is criticized above, also 
reveals some bio-semiotic insights through its discussion of the accursed share (la part maudite):  
 I will begin with a basic fact: The living organism, in a situation determined by the play 
 of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is 
 necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth 
 of a system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer  grow, or if the excess cannot 
 be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must 
 be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically. [Bataille 1991:21] 
 
This animal ‘expenditure’ (depense) is not merely use or consumption, but a wasting of excess.  I 
am less interested in what Bataille does with this central insight, then with what he leaves out.5  
What critics of Bataille do not typically mention (see Frow 2003) is that such an expenditure is 
also a sign to others of that life and its continued existence.  It is important to note, moreover, 
that the relationship between such expenditures and the beings that release them are motivated, 
rather than arbitrary.  They are not mere symbols of life, in other words, but are related by means 
of resemblance and contiguity, or ‘iconicity’ and ‘indexicality’ (see Peirce 1955). 
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 This becomes clear with a consideration of the forms of expenditure that are peculiar to 
the umwelts of animals.  Kelly Oliver (2009: 208) notes how Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty both 
read Uexküll’s account of umwelt in seemingly contradictory ways, privileging discontinuity and 
continuity between humans and non-human creatures, respectively.  In part, this is because the 
concept itself suggests both possibilities.  Uexküll’s ‘soap bubbles’ confine organisms to their 
own worlds, but these are only isolating if species-level distinctions are presumed to be the most 
central.  Irrespective of the phyletic, generic and specific taxonomic differences that separate the 
creatures of the kingdom animalia, they do share certain core aspects of their umwelts in 
common, particularly as they constrain their communion with one another.   
Broadly speaking, the animal kingdom is characterized by four general features: sexual 
reproduction, motility, developmental growth, and the ingestion of other life forms for 
sustenance.  We are not able to hide in our bubbles, in other words, but must identify one another 
to mate with, raise, eat, avoid and so on.  As creatures generally in motion, animals must leave 
traces behind to find one another and to be found.  Scents and calls are familiar terrestrial 
signals, but they make up only a small fraction of a wide array of traces that animals leave 
behind and circulate in order to locate one another in what could be called a macrobiotic 
spacetime.  What do I mean by this?  None of the four general features can be taken as prior or 
primordial, but the characteristic of movement is particularly interesting because it introduces an 
element of delay in interaction as well as spontaneity.  Movement is not always, or often, goal-
directed, but has a force and a direction all its own (Lingis 2003: 167-169).  We search for one 
another but we also run into each other and the traces we leave behind, as a Londoner does 
whenever they stroll out their front door.   
The production of scat by animals is part of their distinctive species being: the successful 
digestion of other organisms and the translation of the life they’ve consumed into their continued 
existence.  When compared with the microscopic life from which we commonly evolved, this is 
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a notable achievement: the ability to incorporate another life form without destabilizing 
organismal form and identity.  Alexandre Kojève offers a Hegelian reading of this process: ‘The 
being that eats…creates and preserves its own reality by the overcoming of a reality other than 
its own, by the ‘transformation’ of an alien reality into its own reality, by the ‘assimilation’, the 
‘internalization’ of a ‘foreign’, ‘external’ reality’ (1969: 4).  This dialectical account does not go 
far enough, however, as it presumes that organisms already have their own, self-identical reality, 
rather than living in immanent communion with their environments and one another. 
When different organisms encounter animal scat, it is not simply a potential sign of life, 
but of something that is still living—that has digested and continues to endure—which deposited 
that waste and continued on, out of sight.  Waste is a trace particular to macriobiotic spacetime, 
an indexical sign for those organisms semiotically equipped to register its appearance, feel, 
odour and taste.  At the most basic level it tells them: ‘some life passed through here.’  In this 
regard it is not only a matter of bio-semiosis, of life forms interpreting, but semi-biotics, of the 
lingering significance organisms leave behind, the trace meanings of life.  The point isn’t that all 
creatures process this association in some way, but that it is possible for them to do so—it is a 
sign waiting to be interpreted—and many do.  Moreover, this proto-semiotic interpretation 
provides the foundation for second and third-order cognitions that lead creatures to valorise 
waste as polluting (a contaminating form of ‘matter out of place’), as appealing (the remainder of 
its quarry or source of sustenance), and so on. 
In his delightful essay on historical epistemology, ‘Morelli, Freud and Sherlock Holmes: 
Clues and Scientific Method,’ Carlo Ginzburg offers insights into the life of signs across 
different socio-historical locations.  He compares, in particular, the forensic labor of the 
psychoanalyst, the scientist and the detective with the interpretative practice of the hunter.  One 
could imagine bio-semiotics as an epistemology that is trans-corporeal as well as trans-historical.  
Any creature looking to find prey or avoid predators must have internalized habits of perception 
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which had to have been acquired—in their lifetimes or through evolutionary history—through 
encounters with the material deposits of other figures in their behavioural setting.  Crucial to this 
is that scat is not merely an index but also an icon of the creature.  That is, scat is not just a sign 
of their having been there, their previous location and possible proximity, it also suggests their 
having been at all.  The scat stands as a sign of their continued existence, because they were able 
to excrete and because their digesting and excreting allowed them to endure.  Following 
Bataille’s phrasing, this expenditure is not a by-product, but a motor, which propels the animal 
perpetually forward.  Waste would function as an index of the movement that serves as a central 
element in the lives of (most) animals.  As such it would serve as an icon of a creature’s 
continuation, intuited from the expenditure they leave behind.6 
I would thus challenge a foundational premise of the recent book by Michel Serres, 
Malfeasance (2010), which suggests that all creatures pollute in order to lay claim to their 
environments.  The popular guidebook Mammal Tracks & Sign devotes an entire section to 
‘Scat, Urine, and Other Secretions’ and a discussion of the communicative ends to which these 
expenditures are put ‘potentially relaying information’ not only ‘about territorial boundaries or 
ownership, or to contest the presence of another animal’ but also ‘about age, health, and the sex 
of the individual’ to facilitate breeding and group interaction (Elbroch 2003: 458).  In other 
words, all creatures pollute that they might live and by polluting all creatures create a ‘behavioral 
environment’ (following Hallowell 1955): one in which they can move about and engage with 
one another.  That the environment is behavioural is analogous to Gregory Bateson’s description 
of living creatures as ‘organism plus environment’: their corporeal presence is predicated on 
continual cross-species interaction within their surroundings, mediated by a universe of signs to 
which they respond and contribute (see Hoffmeyer 1996).  In this sense, waste can and does 
serve as a powerful conduit for cross-species, inter-corporeal transfer.  
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I remember what an impression it left on me when my mother showed me how to pick 
apart the scat of an owl to identify the fur and bones of mice or other creatures, the semiotic and 
material precipitate of real and recent trans-species encounters. The necessity of expenditure 
means that one can reveal the web of ecological relations and anticipate their continuation.  Dogs 
are especially useful exemplars of this phenomenon.  There is a reason that domestic canines are 
prized for wilderness study and management, and that is their impressive capacity for ‘scat 
detection’ (see Wasser et al. 2004).  They tend to possess this skill for the same reason that 
wildlife researchers desire wild scat: in order that they might take the waste of other creatures as 
signs in action.  Canines are also known to roll in the waste of other animals; it is thought, to 
mask their scent when they approach their prey, although perhaps this is a bio-semiotic example 
of confusing the map for the territory.7  Indeed, this manipulation of waste as an icon, in either 
case, could have led to the domestication of dogs.  According to Coppinger and Coppinger 
(2002), there is reason to suspect that proto-dogs were attracted to human settlements because of 
their wastes and that it was through scavenging at the periphery of encampments that they 
became habituated to human presence.  They cite Dmitri Belyaev’s long term study of dog 
evolution which demonstrates how successive generations can become comfortable with reduced 
‘flight distance,’ the limit at which a panicked response is induced in the nervous system.  Given 
the skill with which canines seem to interpret wastes iconically, the spatio-temporal proximity of 
humans to their wastes introduces new bio-semiotic flexibility into cross-species encounters.8  
What the Coppingers do not point out, in their emphasis on the active involvement of 
dogs in their own evolution, is how peculiar a waste habit it is for the human animal to remain 
alongside their expenditures, thereby collapsing the spatio-temporal distanciation that these 
deposits perform throughout much of the behavioural environment.  We should not be surprised 
by the role of wastes in bio-semiotic development, nor should we be too quick to separate it as 
something wholly different from human waste managements.  Whether or not semi-biotic habits 
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are instinctual, acquired, or both is less consequential than their shared reliance on interpretations 
of material deposits as clues.  If a wolf rolls in waste to resemble their prey, the sympathetic 
magic of a volt sorcerer is similarly reliant on iconic relations between a victim and their wastes.  
As Gell argues, ‘We suffer, as patients, from forms of agency mediated via images of ourselves, 
because, as social persons, we are present, not just in our singular bodies, but in everything in 
our surroundings which bears witness to our existence, our attributes, and our agency’ 
(1998:103).  I would only wish to extend Gell’s idea of what constitutes a ‘social person,’ in this 
context.  As any good hunter knows, it is not necessary to be human to leave traces behind. 
Waste is not only a sign of life.  Kojève was not aware of the microbiome of living 
creatures subsisting in his gut that not only resisted being digested by him but made his very 
digestion possible.  From this perspective, the appearance of corporeal independence is partly an 
illusion made possible by further cross-species dependencies (Margulis and Sagan 1986; Lingis 
2003; Haraway 2008).  The interpretation of waste as semi-biotic is only the most basic one 
possible for a creature, that life has passed on and continues somewhere else, but it is not the 
only one or even the most fundamental.  For example, some animals seek out scat, not as a trace 
to interpret, but as a source of nutrition in itself, or a good location to lay eggs and nurture their 
young.9  Regardless of how it is interpreted, waste deposits are an invitation for further 
engagement between organisms (see Hird 2012).  The circulation of waste matter goes beyond 
the animal to participate in ecological relationships with plants and microbes, beginning with 
those organisms we do not digest, which after defecation continue to break down our faeces in 
the open air, now joined by others.  
We may now define waste objects, most generally, as deposits rejected and released by 
animals, rather than whatever is symbolically categorised as such.  Clearly, it cannot be assumed 
that humans are the only creatures that perceive and classify waste taken in this way.  From the 
fly compelled to lay eggs in it, the dog to roll in it, or the human to clean it up, a wide variety of 
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beings are motivated to interpret waste as a significant set of things actually in the world, 
precisely because they serve as the meaningful deposits and necessary expenditures of living 
beings.  More importantly, these different creatures are drawn to waste because, once it has been 
left behind, it invites new material and semiotic entanglements. 
 
The evolution of the posterior field 
 
 
It is worth noting that a blood trail, a footprint, or a pheromone can also be understood as semi-
biotic in the much the same way that I have described animal scat.  I do not dispute that these 
also serve as material deposits; my argument is that I think much could be gained by 
investigating the ways in which waste resembles these objectual forms rather than simply ‘dirt.’  
It is not that the dirt metaphor is entirely mistaken, but that it closes off certain pathways of 
understanding while opening up others.  If waste is distinct from other semi-biotic traces, it is 
because wastes are necessary and conspicuous expenditures.  These deposits have to be released 
and, therefore, provide an available resource for the behavioural environment.  In this sense, 
waste is not only a clue to a creature that has recently passed by, but an opportunity to engage in 
new interactions.  Once these material deposits are released, life processes intercede, breaking 
down and reassembling them into new configurations.  That is, unless steps are taken to arrest 
this process.  This is where it is useful to speak of waste—this general set of necessary 
expenditures produced and perceived by creatures in their own ways—as resembling something 
that only humans seem to produce.  Even these expenditures, however, are not created without 
plenty of nonhuman help (Hird 2012).   
In Gesture and Speech, anthropologist André Leroi-Gourhan argues that the evolution of 
the anterior field in animals occurs around the two poles of developing forelimbs and faces, 
suggesting that our bilateral symmetry is an antecedent to the integration of gestural and verbal 
activity in humans (1993: 31-36).  What makes the development of anteriority significant for 
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animal life is the capacity to direct attention and interaction forward, toward others: ‘to seek out 
a face is to put a question to it’ (Lingis 2003: 179).  Anteriority not only improves individual 
survival, in other words, it opens up new opportunities for intra- and infra-species engagement, 
based on perceptual cues and clues—images, sounds, scents—released and received.10  If we 
were to speculate on the evolution of the posterior field, by contrast, we would turn away from 
face-to-face and limb-to-limb encounters and follow, instead, the traces, the deposits left behind.  
The consequences would be no less significant for ecological relationships in the behavioural 
environment, but they would tend to be characterized by spatiotemporal distanciation, rather than 
the immediate co-presence of face-to-face engagements.  
I want to argue that the way humans have developed the posterior field can help account 
for why it is that the semi-biotic character of waste is typically overlooked in scholarship.  It can 
also explain what the value of recognizing this character is for our considerations of human 
wastes that are not animal scat, which understandably tend to be of greater concern to scholars, 
activists, and institutions.  One reason that waste is not seen as a sign of life in action is its more 
common association with death and environmental disruption.  This is the legacy of what I term 
mass waste.  Mass waste is a historical product of the 18th century and European urbanization, 
which introduced the increasing externalization of waste practices and expertise until systems of 
collection and disposal gradually emerged as a professional occupation all their own, that of 
sanitary engineering (see Alexander and Reno 2012: 5-8).  Human settlement has, for millennia, 
involved systems of waste management, including sewers, waste collectors and dumps.  Just 
because waste is amassed, does not mean it is mass waste, however.  What defines mass waste is 
that it no longer refers back—like animal scat—to the body that left it behind.  Mixed in with the 
wastes of other people, discards lose their indexical connection to the being that generated it, 
they become anonymous, and acquire an abstract, general character.  We speak of ‘garbage’ and 
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‘rubbish’ as mass nouns, as a type of substance, but this is only because there are systems in 
place to assemble them in this way.      
There are many varieties on the continuum between waste as semi-biotic and mass waste 
and I do not want to overemphasize the discontinuity between them.  Mass waste can still be 
picked through, as in identity theft or sewer epidemiology, in order to re-establish the link 
between the waster and the waste, to individuate some indexical connection from the mass of 
common rubbish.  Worldwide, however, the progressive ‘modernization’ of mass waste has 
usually involved maintaining its anonymity.11  Mass waste is created when the wastes of 
populations stop being deposited and are instead made mobile so that they can amass in new 
forms elsewhere.  Since the end of the nineteenth century, this ‘elsewhere’ has typically been an 
incinerator or a landfill.  Innovative forms of Euro-American mass disposal, these technologies 
were precisely engineered in order to remove wastes from the influence of other life forms 
(micro-organisms, insects and vermin) and forms of life (scavengers and scrap dealers).  Modern 
waste management could be thought of as a semi-biotic abduction, or hypothesis, about the 
possible alternative lives of waste.  Flushing waste into rivers, burning it to ash or burying it 
below ground prevented human discards from proliferating new and unwanted life, including 
microbial disease.  The development of the sanitary landfill, or closed tip, in the early twentieth 
century was meant not only to protect people from unpleasant odours and sights, but also to 
cover waste so that flies and other vermin could not access it, precisely to interrupt the unruly 
semi-biotic participation of waste deposits in behavioural environments. 
There do exist forms of amassing waste that still leave open the possibility of depositing 
potent signs and generating new forms of life, sometimes altogether beyond the animal.  Among 
the Pueblo of Jemez described by Elsie Clews Parsons, for example, local dumping grounds are 
inhabited by a manifestation of the Supreme Being known as ‘Ash Boy’ (Parsons 1980).12  As an 
other-than-human being connected to the hearth and the home, Ash Boy is symbolized by the ash 
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from fireplaces, which is regularly cast off at village dumps along with the other dust and debris 
swept out of living spaces.  Ash Boy presides over cyclical ceremonies that re-dedicate sacred 
kiva rooms and also plays an important role in local mythology; not long ago, it is said that 
children once had ashes from the hearth placed on their foreheads for protection (Ellis 1952: 4; 
see also Levi-Strauss 1955).  Though collapsing the spatiotemporal separation between waste 
maker and waste deposit, Pueblo dumps continue to proliferate other-than-human beings: ‘ashes 
and the dust of old things are a part…of the ancestors, Our Old Fathers.  Consequently, ash piles 
stand as Pueblo shrines on the four sides of the village, and prayer offerings are places upon 
them at intervals’ (Ellis 1966: 806).  For the Pueblo, arguably, it is the connection between ash 
and the reproduction of the family through the hearth that lends dumps and Ash Boy their 
particular potency (see Carsten 1997).  In other words, even cases of actual dirt, of literal dust, 
can be productively reinterpreted beyond Douglasian constructivism as representing life’s 
continuation.  Once again, waste seems to exist at the intersection of map and territory; because 
it is a sign of a form of life it becomes identified as a means of preserving it.     
I do not want to overemphasize the separation between Pueblo dumps and sanitary 
landfills, and I don’t need to, because this difference is already marked in the intellectual project 
of American archaeology.  The reason that ‘Ash Boy’ is familiar to archaeologists is that his 
residence in ash piles has prevented them from digging them up as signs of a past form of life.  
The semi-biotic character of waste not only helps us interpret Pueblo waste practices, but also the 
material and semiotic grounds of archaeological knowledge production.  It is precisely because 
Pueblo—following their namesake—live in settlements that they are in spatial proximity to the 
accumulated waste of previous centuries, undoing the spatiotemporal distanciation of deposit and 
depositor found in other animals.  Furthermore, both Pueblo and their archaeological companions 
see this proximity as an opportunity to establish relationships with the dead through the remains 
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they’ve left behind, but they imagine these relationships and the obligations they involve in 
potentially very different ways.13 
The reason that archaeologists tended not to see digging through these ashes as 
desecration is not only due to their lack of belief in indigenous spirits like Ash Boy, but also 
because their impressions of waste had been disenchanted by waste management systems.  More 
to the point, mass waste had effectively re-enchanted them.  To the extent that mass waste has 
been ‘composted’ back (see Douglas 1984: 168-170) into the cosmologies and ritual practices of 
industrial societies, since the mid-twentieth century, it is in the form of fears about 
environmental devastation, pollution and death.  It is this sense of waste that has dominated 
discussions of the topic, scholarly or otherwise, for many years.  When many speak of ‘waste’ 
they actually mean the peculiar history of mass waste, which defies the semi-biotic character of 
material deposits.  The problem with this common analogy is that mass waste is not simply one 
form of waste among others, but is one that intentionally distorts the process of cross-species 
transfer.  The reason that recognition of waste’s semi-biotic significance has been elusive can be 
accounted for by the predominance of mass waste management systems in the societies that 
waste scholars tend to occupy.  As mass waste has become more and more concentrated and 
contaminating, it is not the generation of life but especially the spread of pollution, the 
interruption and cessation of life, which has come to dominate public images of waste.  Taking 
on waste en masse, and thus making it more easily controllable and legible to engineers, states 
and corporations, has made it more dangerous to human and non-human life.  It is in anticipation 
of this danger that waste management systems continue to spread worldwide in the guise of 
medically necessary modern sanitation.  
Through incineration and conventional landfill, it could be argued that mass waste makes 
material deposits appear undead, lifelike and yet unable to generate new ecological possibilities.  
One can think of environmental, technical, and regulatory approaches to mass waste as the 
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zombie model.  Mass waste must be contained forever, encased in a landfill, because it is thought 
threatening to everything it comes into contact with and yet it cannot die, cannot be finally 
destroyed.14  This undead, contaminating waste is the obverse of the semi-biotic forms that 
preceded it historically and evolutionarily.  The development of various toxic and nuclear mass 
wastes have further shaped our assumptions about what counts as waste and what ought to be 
done with it and thought about it.   
My contention is not that waste is harmless, but that the tendency to see mass waste as a 
sign of the times, a symptom of the excessive cycles of production and consumption, which it is, 
is only one arena of signification that waste is capable of proliferating and should not provide 
sole inspiration for definitions of waste at their most general. 
In fact, the semi-biotic character of life has not vanished entirely from mass waste 
systems, nor could it.  In recent years there have actually been efforts to rethink waste 
management precisely in terms of fostering life.  Unless biological waste is incinerated, microbes 
cannot be eliminated from waste management processes.  The primary impact of the anaerobic 
microbes in the midst of landfills, which otherwise remain concealed under the surface, is their 
exhalation of gas.  For many decades, up-to-date landfills have required internal gas collection 
networks to redirect biogas so that it can be safely flared off.  With the recognition that this 
landfill biogas—which is mostly methane—is a powerful greenhouse gas, there have been 
attempts to transform landfills into bio-generators capable of supplying ‘renewable’ electricity 
and protecting the atmosphere.  It does not take much to make waste, even mass waste, more 
life-like.  In a sense, landfills and dumps have always been a way of fostering life, a bio-political 
means of securing people from exposure to their waste by collecting it en masse and containing 
it.  But harnessing mass waste in this way is continually troubled by its undead, corrupt and 
corrupting status.  
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The history of mass waste management, this particular branch of the more encompassing 
evolution of the posterior field, has obscured how it is that all wastes serve as means of exchange 
between living forms.  Mass waste management has done so by making it seem as if risk to 
humans and environments is their primary meaning.  Seeing waste, instead, as a temporary set of 
things in between forms of life, rather than between disorder and order, would arguably serve to 
foster a better environmental politics, not only conceptual clarity. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that it is worth thinking, not simply what waste is for humans, but how a set of 
things we call ‘waste’ are generally interpreted by multiple species—especially fellow animals—
and serve to mediate transactions between beings, typically divided in space and time.  My 
argument has been that, far from an anomalous product of arbitrary social classifications, wastes 
are signs of a living thing, one that continued to live as evidenced by its having left something 
behind.  Beyond a reassessment of the Douglas theory of pollution, bio-semiotics offers an entre 
into the problem of the human as animal, and the animal as animated, rather than wholly instinct-
driven.  Being animal is something distinctly different from the mere fact of being alive, but it is 
also more general than being human.  Suspended along this continuum, animal analysis serves 
both as an alternative antidote to anthropocentrism and a means of contending with the biological 
‘facts of life’ while still challenging reductionist tendencies in the life sciences.  Uexküll 
advocated for an appreciation of animation, in part to contend with Darwinian ethologists who 
were emphasizing the power of instinct to dictate the behaviour of what were thought to be lesser 
creatures.  Bio-semiotics offers a fruitful counterpoint to interpretations that rely on theories of 
instinctual disease-avoidance to explain disgust (Rozin and Nemeroff 1990; Royzman and Sabini 
2001) and aversion to ‘dirt’ (Stevenson, Case and Oaten 2011).  As Hoffmeyer (1996) argues, it 
is important to distinguish between the historical conditions of a species’ genotypic inheritance, 
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including past selection pressures and fitness of forbearers, on the one hand, and the state of 
being alive and actively making ones way through the world, on the other. 
Animal scat is the perfect starting point for a general theory of waste because it is already 
implicated in trans-species interaction from the beginning.  Bacteria inside and outside of animal 
bodies breaks down what we digest and gives scat the particular form and transient material 
trajectory we are accustomed to.  Our ability to defecate gives us our identity as multi-celled 
prokaryotes; it reflects our ability to fully digest the other life forms that we swallow in pieces. 
This digestion is complete not because we completely break these pieces down, but because we 
retain our integrity as consumer, something that the thing we’ve swallowed gradually loses.  And 
yet, it is the indigestible bacteria within that streamline this digestion, make it possible.  Scat is 
not mere symbolic categorisation, although it surely is that as well.  It is also the actual remnant 
of an animal’s indigestible ‘mess mates’ within (Haraway 2008) and, if not their agency, 
certainly the effect of their behaviour on ours (Lingis 2003).  A failure to recognize the liveliness 
of waste, to view it as primarily corrupting and undead, has limited not only the development of 
social theory, but arguably ‘western’ medical practice as well.  The recent (re)discovery of faecal 
‘transplants’ for humans and farm animals, for example, relies on the continuing liveliness of 
‘healthy’ stool and, particularly, its ability to improve upon the micro-biome of sick animal guts 
(see Grady 2013).   
Seen in this light, the distinction between animal scat and human stool appears less 
tenable.  If the latter often takes the form of sewage, of undead, mass waste, it does not therefore 
stop being subject to cross-species exchanges.  Our mess mates carry on just as well breaking 
down our food within or our excrement without.  The distinction between scat and stool, lively 
trace and abandoned deposit, is not a trivial one furthermore.  This linguistic convention speaks 
to the anthropocentric interpretation of animal limitation and human exception, for example, 
through Lacan’s claim that the non-human animal is incapable of covering up its tracks, erasing 
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the traces it leaves behind (see Oliver 2009: 184-189).  Derrida’s rejoinder is to question whether 
even the exalted ‘Man’ can do so (2008: 135-6).  Humans may avoid scattering excrement, 
garbage and other material deposits, amassing it instead in sewers and landfills, but this 
anthropocentric conceit is difficult to maintain given the restless activity of the micro- and 
macrobiotic creatures living amid our wastes, hot on our trail from the start.  In this sense, the 
inerasable trace of scat is a good metaphor for all waste: a seamless conduction of material 
expenditure between life processes, which never ceases but only begets more life.  The non-
human history of waste management reveals more continuity between scat and mass waste than 
would normally be supposed.  Waste is productively thought of in this way, as a moment of 
exchange between living beings, the temporary illusion of non-life, which continues to be 
microscopically lively and readily gives way to more macroscopic arrangements.  
If I were to imagine my former South London neighbourhood in this way, I would be 
forced to recognize, not only my interrelationship with the defecating pigeons and dogs of the 
area, but with the waste workers who tirelessly maintain our behavioural environment from 
material breakdown.  Instead, we tend to imagine waste as an abstract form of social/material, 
something static and undead, when in reality is it unavoidably entangled with multiple life forms 
and forms of life.  We need not lament this loss of awareness, as it is part and parcel of the 
healthy bodies and dwellings we enjoy.  But nor can we apprehend waste as a mere theoretical 
tool or analogy.  The management of mass waste was helping to instate divides between society 
and nature, meaning and matter, and human and nonhuman long before scholars in the human 
sciences thought it wise to stitch them back together again.  We cannot merely approach waste as 
a new terrain to test out familiar approaches, without first understanding how it has already 
shaped them, working beneath our notice and behind our backs.  The benefit of rediscovering the 
significance of waste, through our shared animality, is not merely that we have found yet another 
counterpoint to social constructivism, but that we might see what cross-species relations and 
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material and semiotic conditions made possible this paradigm shift in the first place, and which 
continue to shape our attempts to recycle waste or throw it away. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 In her analysis of the abominations of Leviticus Douglas uses the example of the unclean and 
inedible pig.  The reason for this taboo, she claims, cannot be found in the nature of the creature 
itself, but can only be understood by looking at the system through which edible creatures are 
classified, rendering the form of the pig exceptional by comparison.  In this way an ideal 
symbolic order—Rabbinical stricture—mediates how the world is perceived by privileging 
orderliness and devaluing the anomalous confusion of ‘dirt.’ 
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2 Describing the connection between faeces and the body as non-arbitrary does not mean 
suggesting it is straightforward and immediate.  Faeces is a clue to the working insides of the 
living animal which otherwise would remain opaque.  Bio-semiotics following Peirce (1955) 
considers icons and indexes non-arbitrary.  Thus, arguing that excretion is on some level a non-
symbolic experience does not mean positing a body that is somehow ‘prior to the sign’, a 
position that Judith Butler (1993: 30) rightly takes issue with; rather bio-semiotics attempts to 
‘think through the indissolubility of materiality and signification’ (1993: 30; see also the 
‘material semiotics’ of Haraway 2008). 
 
3 This list is primarily about strolling through London’s public spaces.  If one has access to a 
private garden they might have to contend with urban foxes, who have a habit of defecating on 
children’s toys—an effect of their urban ‘displacement’ on territory-marking (see Fuller 2010: 
23). 
 
4 Public urination is a more difficult problem to solve, but in an effort to do so some London 
councils have installed ‘pop up’ public urinals to discourage the practice. 
 
5 I thank an anonymous reviewer for helping me to clarify this point. 
 
6 Animals that do not leave the waste they excrete behind through locomotion such as corals, 
barnacles and mussels tend to inhabit marine environments that carry it away for them.  They 
also share in common a tendency to make their homes from their secretions of calcium 
carbonate.  Rather than move away from the materials they release, they have evolved to settle in 
them, inhabiting them as shells and reef constructs.  One could argue that they have evolved to 
interpret some of their expenditures as signs for their own use rather than for another.  The main 
reason we tend not to think of the shells of molluscs as ‘waste’ is the same reason we do not 
think of our own hair skin or nails as waste products until we shed them: they are not quite waste 
so long as they continue being a part of life processes. 
 
7 One might ask the same question about bitches that habitually eat the faeces of their puppies. 
Are they protecting their young from being identified and tracked by predators?  Are they 
scavenging an easy meal?  Or perhaps are they ingesting a lively trace of something they treasure 
forming an impression of their new pups? 
 
8 Perhaps what we call domestication rests upon nothing more than more map/territory 
conflation; that is, human beings are appealing to dogs because they have become accustomed to 
representations of them.  In this case, it would be more accurate to say that it is humans who are 
the icons of their waste not the other way around.  Maybe for domestic dogs habitually drinking 
out of the toilet or begging for scraps are such irresistible habits because they spark an ancient 
reminder of why they like us so much to begin with: we resemble our waste. 
 
9 I wish to thank Oana Mateescu for helping me to clarify this point. 
 
10 Canines once again offer a useful example not only in terms of their propensity for 
communicating through their posterior limb (their tails) but for studying one another nasally 
from behind. 
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11 One of the appeals of recycling, not only ideologically but materially, is that it involves 
stripping discards further down to their material substrates eliminating a potential link between 
waste-producer and waste object altogether (see Alexander and Reno 2012). 
 
12 According to Richard Parmentier (1979) ‘Ash Boy’ is one version of a culture hero 
(Poseyemu) that is found with different names among many indigenous groups throughout the 
North American southwest, including Zuni, Tewa and the Keresan villages.  He argues that these 
Pueblo variants do not share the same linear narrative but make up a ‘mythological spiral’ 
(1979:609); for example after Spanish colonization the historical figures of Montezuma and 
Jesus became added to the Poseyemu mythos. 
 
13 And yet the act of forming relationships with the dead is not always oppositional.  In the mid-
1950s the Pueblo sought archaeological assistance to use shrine areas as evidence to establish 
their length of occupation in their successful land claim against the U.S. government (Ellis 
1966). In some cases Pueblo assisted with interpretation and oversaw the work to ensure it was 
done respectfully; in other cases the work was and is still forbidden. 
 
14 Even when incinerated, mass waste creates more forms of pollution emissions and ash, which 
have to be treated, regulated and sometimes, in the case of ash, landfilled. 
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